De la Espriella realigns immigration policy on two fronts

Here, “de la Espriella” means Abelardo de la Espriella, Colombia’s president since August 7, 2026. It does not mean the De La Espriella law firm or the unrelated Eleventh Circuit case, De La Espriella Martelo. The immigration policy at issue is the new president’s August 23–24 announcement: a domestic enforcement campaign in Colombia paired with a US-facing commitment to receive Colombian asylum seekers.

This is a policy explainer, not legal advice. Legal-background reviewer: not named in the available publication record. Last verified: August 25, 2026, 00:00 UTC. Enforcement details are moving quickly: raids were announced for “this very week,” while Migración Colombia reportedly had no director and faced staffing constraints.

The practical reading is therefore narrower than the political message. De la Espriella has announced a two-front realignment, reversing roughly a decade of Colombian protection policy in public and administrative terms. But the announcement does not, by itself, create a blanket power to remove people from Colombia, criminalize irregular status, or require the United States to return every Colombian who seeks asylum.

The Colombian Front

On August 23–24, the government directed joint operations by the national police and Migración Colombia. The stated order of priority was migrants who commit crimes, followed by migrants without regular status. The accompanying “Colombians first” framing presents the operation as a public-order measure and a reversal of the more protective approach associated with the previous decade.[1]

The scale explains why the announcement matters. Colombia has hosted approximately 2.8 million Venezuelans, roughly 90 percent of the country’s migrant population. About 848,000 people were described as being in irregular status, including approximately 193,000 children. The 2021 Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos, or ETPV, produced roughly 2.3 million temporary permits, although new permits had reportedly stopped about three years ago.[1]

Those figures describe administrative status, not a criminal population. Colombian law does not use “illegal immigrant” as a legal category, and irregular presence is not itself a crime. A person may lack regular authorization to remain while still having a status question, an administrative procedure, family ties, documentation issues, or a protection claim that must be handled through the applicable process.

That distinction changes the advice a lawyer gives. A police operation aimed at people suspected of committing crimes raises one set of questions: the suspected offense, arrest authority, evidence, and criminal procedure. A status-enforcement operation aimed at people without regular documents raises another: identity, permit history, notice, administrative authority, appeal or review rights, and the consequences of any removal decision. Treating the second category as proof of criminality can misdescribe the client before the case is even reviewed.

Implementation is also less settled than the announcement suggests. Migración Colombia, the agency expected to participate in the operations, reportedly lacked a director and was understaffed when the raids were announced.[1] That does not make the order irrelevant. It does mean that counsel should distinguish a presidential direction from an executed raid, a published administrative instruction, a permit decision, or a completed removal proceeding.

The US-Facing Promise

The second front began earlier. On June 22, Senator Bernie Moreno said that de la Espriella had “immediately agreed that ANY Colombian citizen claiming asylum should be returned to Colombia,” adding that “Coming to America is a privilege, not a right.”[2][3] The statement is important as evidence of a political commitment between officials. It is not, standing alone, a US removal rule.

US asylum adjudication remains individualized. A person’s nationality may affect the factual analysis, including arguments about changed country conditions, but it does not replace the adjudication of that person’s claim. Latin America Reports describes experts and a former immigration judge rejecting the idea that either president can unilaterally dictate the outcome of every asylum case.[3]

The available figures show why a blanket-return statement should not be treated as a routine administrative instruction. Latin America Reports reported more than 235,000 asylum petitions since 2021 and 1,017 Colombian asylum grants in fiscal year 2024.[3] A separate figure of 36,651 Colombian removal orders in fiscal year 2026, described as the fifth-highest total by nationality, was attributed through ACoM to TRAC.[2] These numbers should be rechecked against the underlying EOIR and TRAC datasets before being used for case-specific advice; the TRAC quick-facts page is dynamic, and the cited Stateline material was only partially confirmed for this article.

A Colombian government agreement to receive its nationals could affect logistics, diplomatic cooperation, or the destination available after a lawful US removal decision. It does not erase the requirement to determine whether a particular person qualifies for asylum or another form of protection. Nor does the Moreno statement itself expand expedited removal, authorize removal without the required process, or convert a pending asylum claim into an immediately executable return order.

For US counsel, the relevant questions remain operational: what proceeding is pending, what notice has been issued, whether a removal order exists, what protection application has been filed, and whether a new agency instruction has actually changed procedure. The same announced-policy-versus-enforceable-law distinction applied in recent analysis of ICE airport arrests is useful here: a political signal can change the risk assessment before it changes the legal authority.

Two Risk Tracks

The record now supports two separate tracking systems. On the Colombian side, counsel should watch for actual joint operations, the identity and authority of the Migración Colombia leadership, published instructions, permit decisions, and the treatment of people in irregular status. On the US side, counsel should watch for any formal change to removal procedures affecting Colombian nationals, new country-specific instructions, and the status of each client’s asylum or removal case.

The distinction is not merely editorial. A client may face a heightened enforcement environment in Colombia without being criminally present there. A Colombian national in US proceedings may face a more difficult factual presentation if country-conditions arguments change, while still retaining an individualized adjudication process. In both jurisdictions, the consequence of a wrong category is practical: the wrong filing, the wrong deadline, the wrong expectation about detention or return.

As of late August 2026, de la Espriella’s announcements are a serious political signal, but their enforceable surface remains narrower. The domestic crackdown requires observable administrative execution, and the US-facing pledge cannot substitute for individualized asylum adjudication. Until raids, permit decisions, Colombian instructions, or US removal-policy changes show otherwise, announced commitments and enforceable obligations should remain separate entries in the file.

References

1. Colombia immigration crackdown: President Abelardo de la Espriella orders raids and vows ‘Colombians first’ — The Guardian, August 25, 2026
2. Colombian asylum seekers hoped de la Espriella would be a bridge to Trump. Turns out he is — American Community Media, 2026
3. Can the US and Colombia team up to expel asylum seekers? — Latin America Reports, 2026