Charges Richard Stevenson Faces in the Fox River Boat Crash
A statute-by-statute breakdown of the charges Richard Stevenson faces in the fatal Fox River boat crash: the aggravated DUI and reckless homicide counts, their sentencing ranges, and the concurrent sentencing rule that caps total exposure at 14 years, with the key unknowns remaining at this stage.
- Jurisdiction
- Illinois, United States
- Court
- McHenry County Circuit Court
- Judge
- Cynthia D. Lamb
- AI tool named
- None
- Ruling date
- Jul 27, 2026
- Source document
- View primary court order ↗
- Last verified
- Jul 29, 2026
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Companion explanation — secondary to the source document above
Richard Stevenson faces three felony counts in the fatal Fox River boat crash, but the charging arithmetic is not three counts times fourteen years. Based on the charges reported from the McHenry County complaint, the realistic maximum exposure described by the available materials is 14 years, because the counts sit inside the same Class 2 felony range and Illinois sentencing treats them concurrently rather than as a simple stack.
This is a Risk Digest-style legal-risk record outside the site’s usual AI-sanctions lane: a sourced charge analysis, not a reconstruction of the crash as breaking news. The useful question is narrower than the public horror of the case. It is: what exactly was charged, under which Illinois statutes, and what sentence exposure follows from those statutes at this early stage?
| Reported count | Statutory route | Felony class | Reported sentencing range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aggravated DUI causing death, Count 1 | 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F), reached through the boating-under-the-influence statute | Class 2 felony | 3 to 14 years |
| Aggravated DUI causing death, Count 2 | 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F), reached through the boating-under-the-influence statute | Class 2 felony | 3 to 14 years |
| Reckless homicide | 720 ILCS 5/9-3; likely the under-the-influence Class 2 theory, based on the reported complaint facts | Likely Class 2 felony, not independently confirmed from the docket | 3 to 14 years if the under-the-influence enhancement applies |
| Aggregate exposure described by the available materials | Concurrent sentencing, not a straight sum of counts | Class 2 maximum controls | 14 years |

The Reported Complaint Charges
ABC News reported that Stevenson was held without release after being charged in connection with the fatal boating crash, and CBS Chicago reported that the McHenry County complaint includes two counts of aggravated DUI causing death and one count of reckless homicide tied to the Fox River crash near McHenry, Illinois.[1][2] Those reports matter because they identify the count labels, not merely the moral description of the alleged conduct.
The two aggravated-DUI counts are the cleanest part of the matrix. They are reported as Class 2 felony aggravated DUI causing death counts. In a boating case, that phrasing can look odd at first glance because the vehicle is a boat, not a car. Illinois gets there through the boating-under-the-influence statute, which incorporates the aggravated DUI causing-death framework rather than creating an entirely separate sentencing vocabulary for every death-resulting boating case.
The reckless homicide count is the one that needs a pencil mark beside it. The available reports describe the count as a Class 2 felony with a DUI enhancement, and the alleged facts point strongly toward the under-the-influence version of reckless homicide. But the charging language itself has not been independently verified from the McHenry County Circuit Clerk’s docket for this article. Until the filed complaint is in hand, it is better to call that the likely reckless-homicide theory rather than pretend the subclass has been confirmed from the primary record.
How The BUI Count Becomes An Aggravated DUI Causing-Death Count
The statutory hinge is 625 ILCS 45/5-16, the boating-under-the-influence provision. The statute treats operating a watercraft while under the influence as the boating analogue to DUI, and when a death results, the offense is treated as a Class 2 felony carrying a 3-to-14-year imprisonment range and fines up to $25,000.[3]
That is where 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) enters the analysis. The DUI statute’s aggravated-DUI causing-death language supplies the framework that the boating statute uses for a death-resulting BUI. In ordinary language, the State is not saying the Fox River boat was a motor vehicle. It is using a boating statute that borrows the aggravated DUI causing-death consequences for a fatal impaired-operation allegation.
That distinction is not academic. Calling every count simply “DUI” blurs the charging route. Calling every count “boating homicide” invents a label that does less work than the statute. The count that matters for exposure is a Class 2 death-resulting BUI/aggravated-DUI theory with a 3-to-14-year range, as reported from the complaint and reflected in the statutory overview.[2][3]
The Reckless Homicide Count Depends On The Under-Influence Theory
Illinois reckless homicide is not automatically a Class 2 felony. Under 720 ILCS 5/9-3, reckless homicide is generally treated differently from the enhanced version that applies when the killing occurs while operating under the influence. The overview source describes reckless homicide in Illinois as a homicide offense based on reckless conduct and notes the statute’s enhanced treatment where intoxicated operation is part of the offense.[4]
For Stevenson, the reported facts point toward the enhanced Class 2 version: the State’s theory, as reported, is not merely that a boat was operated recklessly, but that it was operated while Stevenson was impaired and in a way that caused a death. CBS Chicago reported a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.236, while other reporting put the figure at 0.20; either way, the reports describe a number far above the legal limit.[2]
The variation between 0.20 and 0.236 should not be ironed out into a false precision. It may reflect different testing points, different descriptions of the evidence, or later extrapolation, but the present public record does not establish that sequence cleanly. For charging analysis, the safer statement is that news reports describe a BAC range of approximately 0.20 to 0.236, not that one exact number has been confirmed from the docket.
If the reckless homicide count is the under-the-influence Class 2 theory, it carries the same 3-to-14-year range as the death-resulting BUI counts. If it were an ordinary reckless homicide count without that enhancement, the classification and range would be lower. The available reports support the enhanced reading, but the complaint language remains the missing piece.
Why Three Counts Do Not Produce A 42-Year Maximum
The sloppy version of the math is easy: three Class 2 counts, each with a 14-year maximum, equals 42 years. That is not the exposure described by the available Illinois sentencing analysis here. Concurrent sentencing means the sentences run at the same time, so the governing maximum is the highest single-count maximum: 14 years.
That does not make the charges light. A 3-to-14-year sentencing range for a death-resulting impaired-operation case is a severe felony range. It does, however, keep the charge analysis from becoming an arithmetic exercise detached from the sentencing rule that actually controls the exposure.
The distinction also affects how the case should be described in legal-risk terms. Stevenson faces multiple felony theories arising from the same fatal event. The State has more than one statutory route to conviction. But the public maximum now supported by the reported complaint and sentencing framework is 14 years, not a cumulative 42.
What The Detention Order Adds, And What It Does Not
The SAFE-T Act detention order is important, but it should not be made to do the work of a conviction. FOX 32 Chicago reported that Judge Cynthia D. Lamb ordered Stevenson detained on July 27 after finding clear and convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat.[5] That is a pretrial-release ruling, not a sentencing finding after trial.
Still, the detention record explains why the case was treated seriously from the first appearance. FOX 32 reported allegations that Stevenson drank Fireball whiskey before and during the boat ride, ignored passenger warnings, operated at about 80 mph in a no-wake zone, and was identified by witnesses as the operator.[5] Those are not decorative details. They are the kind of facts a detention judge can rely on when assessing dangerousness at the front end of a criminal case.
ABC7 Los Angeles also reported a prior record that included three DUI arrests, two DUI convictions, three reckless driving matters, four speeding matters, a fleeing-police offense between 1997 and 2005, a 2023 speeding matter for 26 to 34 mph over the limit, and a 2022 Florida careless boat-operation citation.[6] Prior record evidence can matter at detention. It does not rewrite the statutory range for the charged Class 2 offenses.
The detention order therefore has two proper uses in this analysis. It is an early signal that the court viewed the State’s evidence as strong enough to justify detention under the SAFE-T Act standard. It is also a reminder that the charged case is not merely formal paper. But it does not prove guilt, does not resolve statutory ambiguities in the reckless-homicide count, and does not increase the maximum exposure beyond the sentencing range attached to the charged offenses.
The Unresolved Pieces
Several points remain open because the public materials are still news reports describing court filings, not the filings themselves. The McHenry County complaint and written detention order have not been independently verified here from the circuit clerk’s docket. That matters most for the exact language of the reckless homicide count.
- The reckless homicide charge is likely the under-the-influence Class 2 version, but the precise statutory subclass should be checked against the complaint.
- The BAC evidence is reported in different figures, roughly 0.20 to 0.236, and the current public record does not explain the difference.
- No plea posture, motion schedule, suppression litigation, indictment development, or trial setting is available from the materials used here.
- The detention finding is a pretrial dangerousness ruling, not a final adjudication of the charged offenses.
At the initial-appearance posture, the clean legal-risk statement is this: Richard Stevenson faces two reported Class 2 aggravated DUI causing-death counts through Illinois’ BUI framework and one reported reckless homicide count that appears to be the enhanced Class 2 under-the-influence theory. The detention order, as reported, points to strong early evidence. The realistic maximum exposure described by the available materials is 14 years, not a count-by-count sum, with the exact reckless-homicide language and later procedural developments still unresolved.
References
- Man held without release after boating accident leaves victim decapitated — ABC News
- Lisle man Richard Stevenson charged in fatal Fox River boat crash allegedly had BAC nearly 3 times legal limit — CBS Chicago
- Boating Under the Influence: Information for Victims — Horwitz, Horwitz & Associates
- Understanding Reckless Homicide in Illinois — Cosley Law Office
- Lisle man accused in fatal Fox River boat crash denied pretrial release — FOX 32 Chicago
- Richard Stevenson, who has history of DUI, speeding offenses, charged in deadly Fox River boat crash near McHenry, Illinois — ABC7 Los Angeles
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